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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Income-tax matters are within the province of accountancy to a large
extent. That this is so has become generally recognized by taxpayers as
well as by lawyers. A great many of the latter profession have equipped
themselves with a familiarity with accountancy theory and have employed
accountants with practical experience, so that they would not be handicapped
in handling tax cases entrusted to them.
Taking this cue from the lawyers many accountants are equipping them
selves with a working knowledge at least of that which constitutes evidence
and the legal machinery as to the proper presentation of proof of the validity
of a taxpayer’s case.
For a number of years accountants have familiarized themselves with the
laws with reference to income, profits, stamp, excise and estate taxes. They
are finding however that this knowledge must be supplemented with a knowl
edge of the rules of evidence, court procedure and cognate matters. This
phase of accountants' equipment has been forced to their attention by the
somewhat formidable nature of proceedings prescribed by the United States
board of tax appeals.
It is undoubtedly the fact that there is much to be said in praise of the
board, its methods and its workings. It has expedited final decision of tax
cases, some of which had remained unsettled for a long time. Its proceed
ings have been carried on with dignity and progressively. Questions at issue
between the bureau of internal revenue and taxpayers have been clarified by
the exclusion of extraneous matter. In short, the board, now about six
months old, has done its work without fuss and splurge, but in a thorough and
businesslike way, and in that short period has disposed of a large number of
cases.
A brief glance at the published decisions indicates that a comparatively
small number of taxpayers’ cases is handled by accountants. In view of the
accountant’s more intimate knowledge of that which is pertinent in most
tax cases and of the usual lack of comprehension of accountancy matters by
the lawyers, this fact is surprising. This condition, however, seemed in
evitable when the rules for practice before this board were first promulgated,
and the disparity as between lawyer and accountant representatives of tax
payers will become greater unless the accountants equip themselves effectively
to handle cases before this body.
An attorney in the solicitor’s department of the bureau of internal revenue,
in a spirit of helpfulness, in commenting upon the fact that some accountants
lack the knowledge of legal procedure which would enable them most effec
tively to present their cases before the board, offered a few hints. Among
those that seem most pertinent are the following:
Be careful in the preparation of petitions that only such facts are alleged
as can be proven.
Be sure of the fact that you can prove to the board that it has jurisdiction
in the case you wish it to hear.
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Remember that proofs that have theretofore been offered to the bureau of
internal revenue are not available to the board without the consent of the
bureau, though this evidence can be subpoenaed. It is advisable to be pre
pared with evidence in addition to that which has been submitted to the
bureau as well as a repetition of the evidence formerly submitted.
The above are the more important of the hints given, but they should be
supplemented by those appertaining to exactitude, clarity and conciseness in
preparing papers and documents that enter into the case. Remember that
the board, however sympathetic it may be to a taxpayer’s plight, takes nothing
for granted but must have the facts stated to it. One should also know the
law and the method of procedure so that he may be aware of any errors
committed by the attorneys for the bureau and be on the alert to direct atten
tion to them.
While the functions of the board are more or less deliberative and it knows
the law and its own methods of procedure, the decisions it makes are based
upon its opinion and interpretation of what it holds has been proven by the
evidence submitted to it. If the evidence for the taxpayer is confused or
inadequate the fact will undoubtedly create doubt in the minds of the adjudi
cators as to the merits of the taxpayer’s contentions and will militate against
his obtaining the relief to which he may be justly entitled.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
The husband and wife may each compute the earned income on $10,000,
if both husband and wife actually rendered personal services for which each
received $10,000 or more and they filed separate returns. (I. T. 2126.)
Amounts paid out in prizes and the expenses of operating baseball pools
are not deductible as expenses of carrying on a trade or business where such
pools are operated in the state of Wisconsin. The taxpayer should report
the entire receipts from the operation of the pools, without credit for any
deductions. (I. T. 2127.)
Losses in betting on horse races are not deductible when incurred in the
state of New York.
The commissioner cannot consolidate returns and tax companies as a single
unit, for section 240 (d) of the act of 1921, merely gives him authority to con
solidate the accounts of two or more related trades or businesses for the pur
pose of making an accurate distribution of gains, profits, income, deductions
or capital. (Sol. Mem. 2396.)
Board of tax appeals has no jurisdiction to determine appeals from de
ficiencies in tax imposed by statutes prior to the act of 1916. (App. David
Mills, decision 81.)
If the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction the board will allow it even though
it was not claimed by the taxpayer in his original return or at any hearing
before the commissioner.
The board has jurisdiction to review a proposed assessment of the 50%
addition to tax for filing a false and fraudulent return.
The board has jurisdiction over appeals from deficiencies arising from the
“special assessment” provisions of the act of 1918. (B. T. A. decision No.
97.)
Taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under 1918 act for exhaustion of patents
under which he holds and exercises rights, in the conduct of his business.
Failure by taxpayer to claim such deductions in his original return does not
constitute the exercise of an election or option and does not preclude the
claiming of such deduction later. (B. T. A. dkt. 35.)

206

Income-tax Department
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3654, December 8, 1924)
Income and excise profits taxes—Revenue acts of 1916 and 1917—Decision
of court
1. Revenue Act of October 3, 1917—Retrospective Application—Con
stitutionality—Dissolved Corporation.
The act of October 3, 1917, which is retrospective, as of January 1, 1917,
is constitutional, and its provisions are applicable to a corporation which
was in existence during part of the year 1917, but was dissolved prior to the
passage of the act.
2. Dissolved Corporation—Act of October 3, 1917—Returns.
A corporation which was in existence during the year 1917, but was dis
solved prior to the passage of the act of October 3, 1917, must file an incometax return and excess profits tax return covering the period from January 1,
1917, to the date of its dissolution as provided by the act of October 3, 1917.
3. Dissolved Corporation—Liability of Stockholders.
Where, upon the dissolution of a corporation assets are distributed to
stockholders, the latter are liable as trustees for the government to the extent
of assets received for federal taxes due and unpaid by the corporation.
4. Dissolved Corporation—Regulations.
The revenue act of October 3, 1917, not having specifically provided a
method of collecting the tax against a dissolved corporation, the commis
sioner of internal revenue was empowered by section 1003 of the act to
promulgate reasonable regulations. Articles 61, 203, and 205 of regulations
33 (revised) held to be reasonable.
5. Statute of Limitations, Section 250 (d), Revenue Act of 1921.
The limitation upon suits by the government provided in section 250 (d)
of the revenue act of 1921, can be set in motion only by the affirmative,
honest act of the taxpayer. The failure to file a return as required by law,
or the filing of a false and fraudulent return suspends the operation of the
statute. Neither general statutes of limitations, nor general doctrines of
laches apply to the government.
6. Same—Returns.
The filing of a return under the provisions of the revenue act of 1916, and
the act of March 3, 1917, in the case of a corporation dissolved in July, 1917,
and the failure to file a return under the revenue act of October 3, 1917, pre
vents the bar of the statute in a suit against stockholders to recover addi
tional taxes due from the corporation.
7. Dissolved Corporation—Returns—Penalties.
The filing of returns under prior acts does not satisfy the requirement of
filing a return under the act of October 3, 1917, and the failure to file such
a return results in a liability for penalties prescribed for failure to file.
The following decision of the district court of the United States for the
district of Nebraska, Omaha division, in the case of United States v. Nelson
B. Updike et al., is published for the information of internal-revenue officers
and others concerned.
District Court of the United States, District of Nebraska, Omaha
Division. No. 651
United States, complainant, v. Nelson B. Updike, Elmer A. Cope, Edward Updike,
Otis M. Smith, Gorton Roth, and Robert B. Updike, defendants
memorandum opinion by the court

Woodrough, district judge: The Missouri Valley Elevator Co. was organ
ized in Nebraska in 1910, and continued in business until July 31, 1917, when
it was dissolved in accordance with the terms of the Nebraska law providing
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for the dissolution of corporations, and its assets were distributed to the
persons who were then stockholders.
The government brings this suit in equity to compel the stockholders to
account for the assets so received by them, to the extent of paying to the Gov
ernment the amount of taxes which were assessed on account of the corpora
tion’s earnings from January 1, 1917, to May 31, 1917, under the provisions
of the revenue act of October 3, 1917.
The corporation had, pursuant to the regulations designated May 31, 1917,
as the close of its fiscal year, and seasonably made its returns and paid the
taxes due from it under the revenue acts of 1916 and March 3, 1917. But
after the dissolution of the corporation and the distribution of its assets to the
stockholders, all accomplished about August 1, 1917, the position was taken
by those who had been the managing officers that the provisions of the revenue
act of October 3, 1917, were without application to the corporations so dis
solved, its officers, or its stockholders.
Such was also the ruling of the commissioner of internal revenue, as shown
by the letter of Deputy Commissioner L. F. Spear to two taxpayers in New
York, dated October 27, 1917, declaring that a corporation dissolved in June,
1917, would not be subject to the tax imposed by the act of October 3, 1917,
But on November 17, 1917, this ruling was reversed, and upon the authority of
the decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Brady v. Anderson
(240 Fed. 665), it was ruled that a corporation which was dissolved during the
year 1917, prior to the approval of the act of October 3, 1917, is subject to the
tax imposed by that act. Regulations 33, article 61, was thereupon promul
gated as follows:
Art. 61. Corporation dissolved prior to October 4,1917.—A corporation which
was dissolved in 1917, prior to passage of the war revenue act of October 3,1917,
is subject to tax under the act of September 8,1916, as amended, and also to the
war income tax and the war excess profits tax imposed by the act of October 3,
1917.—Brady et al. v. Anderson (240 Fed. 665). A corporation so situated will
make a return on revised Form 1031, covering the period in 1917 during which
it was in business prior to its dissolution. If it shall have previously made a
return covering this period and shall have paid any excess profits tax under the
act of March 3, 1917, it shall be entitled to credit for the amount of such tax
so paid against any excess profits tax assessable against it under Title II of the
act of October 3, 1917.
In line with the position that the law of October 3,1917, imposed no tax on a
dissolved corporation, its former secretary on March 26, 1918, returned to the
collector of revenue at Omaha the blank form No. 1031 referred to in regula
tions 33, article 61, called “corporation income tax return,” and left it entirely
blank except the name and address of the corporation typewritten in the space
provided therefor. Accompanying the blank was a letter from the former
secretary reciting the dissolution of the corporation and the distribution of its
assets to the stockholders after reserving and paying the federal income tax
and excess profits tax for the fractional period of the year 1917 then ascertain
able and pursuant to the returns of the corporation duly made, amended, and
filed. The former secretary of the company further stated in the letter:
I am addressing this communication to you because I held the position of
secretary of said corporation prior to its dissolution, and because I am aware of
the regulation known as article 61 of the regulations in reference to the income
tax of October 3, 1917 (but which I am advised is erroneous), and in order that
a statement of the facts in this matter may be made for your records.
Afterwards and in October, 1918, the commissioner caused an examination to
be made of the books and records of the corporation and an inspector working
under the commissioner made up an excess profits tax return for the corporation
on the form 1031 specified in regulations 33, article 61, together with a report
reciting among other facts and figures that there was no one with authority to
sign any return. The commissioner thereupon, and in November, 1919, assessed
against the corporation an additional tax according to the rates provided in the
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act of October 3, 1917, in the sum of $34,561.92, which, being unpaid, is the
subject of this suit.
There is no evidence that the audits and computations made by the commis
sioner are wrong, but the defendants deny liability. They insist that the first
ruling of the department was right and that the later and present attitude is
wrong.
A case presenting the question squarely, whether tax should be collected from
the stockholders of a corporation earning income during the period covered by
the tax law but dissolved before final enactment of the law was before the United
States district court of Montana in United States v. McHatton (266 Fed. 602;
T. D. 3043). It was held:
It was the corporation’s duty to pay all taxes lawfully imposed upon it. Taxes
can be thus imposed by retrospective law. (Brushaber v. Railway Co., 240
U. S. 20, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493, Ann. Cases 1917 B, 713, L. R. A. 1917 D,
414.) The corporate duty of payment can not be escaped by dissolution.
(U. S. v. Loading Co. (D. C.) 192 Fed. 223.) And see 28 Op. Attys. Gen. 241;
Brady Case, 240 Fed. 665, 153 C. C. A. 463, certiorari denied 244 U. S. 654, 37
Sup. Ct. 652, 61 L. Ed. 1373.
Although taxes are not debts, and in respect to them the government is not a
creditor, both being of higher nature, no reason is perceived why they are not
within the principle that those who gratuitously take all a debtor’s property,
to the extent thereof, may be held to respond for his present debts and obliga
tions inchoate or vested, or for the damages thereby inflicted—the sometime
“trust fund” doctrine, so far as corporations are concerned.
When defendants took the corporation’s property there was right in plaintiff
to thereafter impose further taxes. To pay any such taxes was an obligation of
the corporation. The right was in its nature inchoate; the obligation was
contingent. Defendants took subject thereto. The contingency happened;
the right vested. The act of September 8, 1916, to this extent takes effect by
relation as of the first of the year, and prior to distribution and dissolution.
Accordingly defendants are liable.
Also in United States v. Boss & Peake (285 Fed. 410; T. D. 3442) the United
States district court of Oregon reached the same conclusion in a case where the
tax involved was under the act of October 3, 1917, as it is in the present case,
and the corporation was dissolved in June of that year. The court there said
that the tax provision of the act of October 3, 1917, is retrospective as of
January 1, 1917, and that it is not unconstitutional, and that stockholders
taking the assets upon dissolution of the corporation were liable for the pay
ment of the tax, and decree was entered for the amount of the tax due with
interest and penalty.
It is urged that those precedents ought not to be followed in this case. The
defendants here have pleaded in their answer “that if the said act of October 3,
1917, be so construed as to become applicable to a corporation organized under
the laws of the state of Nebraska, whose corporate existence had been termi
nated in accordance with such laws prior to the passage of said act, or if the
said act be so construed as to make unlawful or to invalidate the lawful distribu
tion of the assets of said corporation, the Missouri Valley Elevator Co. made
to its stockholders prior to the passage of the act, and while such distribution
was lawful and permitted under existing laws, then the said act of October 3,
1917, in so far as it may be so construed or applied, is contrary to the provisions
of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States in that it
deprives these defendants of their property without due process of law, and
denies to them the equal protection of the laws and will result in taking their
property for public use without just compensation.”
They have thus squarely presented the question of the constitutionality of
the law on which the government’s case rests if it is to be construed so as to
impose liability on defendant.
But in the argument counsel for defendants have further insisted that even if
the law so construed were constitutional and even if congress did have power to
enforce such a tax against stockholders of the dissolved corporation, that in
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fact congress did not exercise such power. They insist that congress did not,
by its language in this act, include a corporation which had dissolved prior to
the enactment and, a fortiori, did not impose liability on the stockholders.
The act of October 3, 1917, provides:
Sec. 4. That in addition to the tax imposed by subdivision (a) of section ten
of such act of September 8, 1918, as amended by this act, there shall be levied,
assessed, collected, and paid a like tax of four per centum upon the income
received in the calendar year 1917 and every calendar year thereafter, by every
corporation, . . . subject to the tax imposed by that subdivision of that sec
tion, except that if it has fixed its own fiscal year, the tax imposed by this section
for the fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1917 shall be levied, assessed,
collected, and paid only on that proportion of its income for such fiscal year
which the period between January 1, 1917, and the end of the fiscal year bears
to the whole of such fiscal year.
The provision of the law of 1916 referred to and designating the corporations
subject to the tax is:
Sec. 10 (a) That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually
upon the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all
sources by every corporation, . . . organized in the United States, no matter
how created or organized ... a tax, . . .
A reading of the statute itself makes it clear that it was the will and the inten
tion of congress to derive revenue from the profits that were made by this cor
poration during the part of the year that it was in business. It explicitly states:
“there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid a tax upon the income
received by every corporation organized within the United States,” and the
period specifically includes the period during which the income was received
by this corporation. The statute does not speak as to corporations “organized
and existing,” but doubtless of set purpose departs from the familiar phrase
“corporations organized and existing,” so as to broaden the application of the
law and in a positive way include every corporation organized in the United
States and so to include this corporation, which was a corporation organized in
the United States and which did receive an income within the period, and as
to that income congress specifically imposes the tax. It would appear, there
for, that if a course of reasoning can be followed to the conclusion that no tax
became due in respect to this income, the conclusion could not rest upon any
failure of congress to declare its will and intent to the contrary with clearness
and certainty.
But it is argued that because an income tax is a tax in personam it must fail
against a corporation dissolved before the law imposing the tax was finally
enacted.
A similar contention as to the nature of income taxes was very elaborately
presented in a case involving the constitutionality of the Oklahoma income
tax law. The state of Oklahoma laid an income tax upon incomes of non
residents derived from their business carried on within the state. It was urged
that an income tax is in its nature a personal tax or a “subjective tax imposing
personal liability upon the recipient of the income,” and that as to a nonresident
the state had no power to impose such liability because the person was not
within its territorial jurisdiction. The supreme court said:
This argument, upon analysis, resolves itself into a mere question of defini
tions, and has no legitimate bearing on any question raised under the federal
constitution.—Shaffer v. Carter (252 U. S. 37, 55).
It would seem the same answer is applicable here. It is conceded that con
gress had the power to lay the tax in respect of the income of the corporation,
and in most positive and direct terms it declared its will and purpose to do so.
If, being defined as a tax in personam the tax would fail because of prior dis
solution of the corporation, then the mere question of the definition ought not
to be deemed to have any legitimate bearing upon the duty of the court to
carry out the expressed will of congress in a matter as to which it concededly
had constitutional power to legislate.
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But it is insisted that because no way is set forth in the statute to ascertain
the income or to assess or collect the tax, and no person is there designated to
make return or payment, the tax must fail on that account, and this argument
is naturally interwoven with the insistence upon the nature of the tax as one in
personam.
In the enactment of the law of October 3, 1917, congress had in mind that
instances would arise where the provisions for its enforcement in the collection
of the tax would be inadequate or lacking and section 1003 is as follows:
That in all cases where the method of collecting the tax imposed by this act
is not specifically provided, the tax shall be collected in such manner as the
commissioner of internal revenue, with the approval of the secretary of the
treasury, may prescribe.

As no method of collecting this tax against a dissolved corporation was specifi
cally provided in the act it became the duty of the commissioner to make regu
lations, and as he has done so, there is open to the court only the inquiry
whether his regulations are reasonable and fairly calculated to carry out the
expressed will of congress. Under his regulations, reservation of funds must
be made by dissolving corporations to cover the tax, and, failing that, the tax
shall be collected by suit against the stockholders. Such regulations appear
to be in conformity with the duty imposed by section 1003, and suggest no
unfairness toward the taxpayers, and are unassailable in the courts. The
amount of the tax having been determined by audit of the books and records
of the corporation, and information duly received by the commissioner, and
assessed and levied according to the rates prescribed by the act, there remained
the lawful duty to bring suit as prescribed by lawful regulation.
It is contended, however, that the suit against the stockholders contravenes
settled principles of equity, not only because there has not been a judgment at
law previously obtained against the corporation itself, but because there is no
trust fund doctrine recognized by federal courts which could reach the assets
in the hands of the stockholders receiving them upon lawful dissolution. It is
presented that at the time the corporation dissolved the dissolution was legal
and in strict conformity with the laws of the state, and that therefore no wrong
was involved in receiving the assets, and no trust could arise with respect to
them.
It was stated by counsel in argument that the defense would not rest upon the
first suggestion as to the failure of the government to sue the corporation at
law before bringing this suit in equity against the stockholders because there
was denial of liability as to either the corporation or stockholders, and mere
multiplication of suits would be useless.
To my mind the expressions of the court in the analogous case of United
States v. McHatton, supra (T. D. 3043), correctly and adequately dispose of the
issue:

When defendants took the corporation’s property, there was right in plaintiff
to thereafter impose further taxes. To pay any such tax was then an obliga
tion of the corporation. The right was in its nature inchoate; the obligation
was contingent. Defendants took subject thereto. The contingency hap
pened; the right vested. The act ... to this extent takes effect by relation
as of the first of the year, and prior to distribution and dissolution.
In the subsequent case of United States v. Boss & Peake (T. D. 3442) the same
view of the law was adopted and applied almost without discussion. The court
said (285 Fed. 410; 418):
It is claimed by Boss that, at the time of the transaction between him and
Peake (concerning transfer of stock) the tax was not in their minds, and that
therefore it did not enter as an element in their agreement; that only the cur
rent liabilities were assumed by him. . . . The parties were . . . required to
take notice of the power of congress to enact a retroactive measure of the kind
denoted by the act of October 3, 1917. . . . The tax provision of the act of
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October 3, 1917, is retrospective as of January 1, 1917, but the act is not
unconstitutional because of that provision.
By way of amplification merely, it may be taken as true that the trust fund
doctrine does not apply in the federal courts to raise any trust in those funds
of a corporation which have been paid out at a time when the corporation was
not rendered insolvent thereby, or was not insolvent, and only applies to the
benefit of creditors who were such at the time of the disbursements. But if
the construction of this tax law, which seems so obvious to me, is correct, then
the government was, at the time of the dissolution, in the same position as an
existing creditor. Its power to levy the tax then existed. The obligation to
respond to the exercise of the power, although at that time an inchoate obliga
tion, was as binding as any other valid debt of the corporation, and the law
imputes knowledge to all participants. In fact, as disclosed by the pleadings
congress had already at the time of the dissolution proceeded so far toward the
final passage of the act that on July 3, 1917, the house bill was reported to the
senate with the finance committee amendments, changing but little the higher
income and excess profits tax rates contained in the bill as passed by the house.
And the bill with amendments was printed in July in the Congressional Record,
Vol. 55, in part 5, pages 4632 to 4637.
In addition to these considerations I am persuaded that the regulation itself
ex proprio vigore compels the court to entertain this suit against the stock
holders. Congress does not provide in the act of October 3, 1917, how this
tax as to dissolved corporations shall be collected. It does empower the com
missioner, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury to provide a
method by regulation. Regulations have been duly promulgated to the effect
that reservation of funds to pay the tax must be made on dissolution of the
corporation, and, failing that, the tax may be collected by suit against the
stockholders. This regulation must be given the force and effect of law be
cause it is in all respects reasonably adapted to the enforcement of the act of
congress and is not in conflict with any statutory provision of law.—Maryland
Cas. Co. v. United States (251 U. S. 342; T. D. 3013).
The principles announced by the supreme court in U. S. v. Chamberlin (219
U. S. 250; T. D. 1674) are also applicable here when it is postulated that the
act of October 3, 1917, is applicable to this corporation. The supreme court
in that case said that by the internal revenue laws the United States are not
prohibited from adopting any remedies for the recovery of a debt due to them
which are known to the laws of the state. It is said that such was the rule as
to the British crown, and the rule respecting the British crown is applicable to
this government, and it has been applied frequently in the different states, and
practically in the federal courts. It is said to be settled that so much of the
royal prerogatives as apply to the king in his capacity of parens patriae or
universal trustee enters as much into our political state as it does into the
principles of the British constitution. (See also U. S. v. N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
249 Fed. 678; T. D. 2697.)
An ordinary contract creditor whose debt existed before the dissolution
could have pursued the assets of the corporation into the hands of the stock
holders and a fortiori the government may do so.
There remains the question whether the right of the government was lost by
lapse of time when this action was commenced on the 24th day of April, 1924.
An accurate and concise digest of the various limitation provisions applica
ble to income and profits taxes under the revenue acts from 1916 to 1921,
inclusive, is found on pages 1029 to 1034, Holmes Federal Taxes, 1923. Study
of the provisions there digested shows that the statute of limitations govern
ing in this case is section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1921, as follows:
Sec. 250 (d) The amount of income, excess profits, or war profits taxes due
under any return made under this act for the taxable year 1921, or succeeding
taxable years, shall be determined and assessed by the commissioner within
four years after the return was filed, and the amount of any such taxes due
under any return made under this act for prior taxable years or under prior
income, excess profits, or war profits tax acts, or under section 38 of the act
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. . . approved August 5, 1909, shall be determined and assessed within five
years after the return was filed, . . and no suit or proceeding for the collec
tion of any such taxes due under this act or under prior income, excess profits
or war profits tax acts, or of any taxes due under section 38 of such act of
August 5, 1909, shall be begun, after the expiration of five years, after the
date when such return was filed, . . .
The salient feature of the statute of limitations incorporated in this section
250 (d) is that it can be set in motion and started to run only by the affirmative,
honest act of the taxpayer and not otherwise. Prior statutes had either
omitted limitations provisions altogether or had allowed mere lapse of time or
official delay to destroy the government’s right, or had fixed the limitations
starting point at the time of a discovery by the commissioner. But such
policies are entirely abandoned in this act, and nullum tempus occurrit regi
as to any tax imposed by any of the laws specified from 1909 to 1921 unless and
until the taxpayer honestly makes and files his return under that law. Then
and not until then time runs in his favor to the complete extinction of his
liability at the end of five years in the case of the October 3, 1917, act. If the
taxpayer fails or refuses to make such a return as the law contemplates, or
willfully makes a false and fraudulent one, proceedings will lie against him to
recover the tax at any time.
After dissolution of this corporation its former secretary sent back to the col
lector of revenue the blank form provided for making the return for the tax
under the law of October 3, 1917, and declared that the corporation was not in
existence and had no officers, directors, or stockholders, and that there was no
money or property of the corporation in existence, and said that he was ad
vised that the regulation, meaning the one requiring return for the tax of Octo
ber 3, 1917, was erroneous. It is contended that the corporation should be
deemed to have made return and to have taken sufficient affirmative action to
start the statute in its favor, because its returns under the 1916 act and the
act of March 3, 1917, being honestly made and filed in July and September,
1917, fairly disclosed its gains and profits for the period covered by the act of
October 3, 1917. The argument is that, the corporation having in this way
honestly given the commissioner the basis to compute the tax under the
October 3, 1917, law, and then having frankly and fully disclosed all the facts
as to the dissolution and distribution of the assets, and having made clear its
claim of no liability, the government’s right to the tax, if any it ever had,
should be deemed barred—it not in five years after August, 1917, when the
returns were made and filed by the corporation, at least five years after the
commissioner was directly and fully informed of all the facts. Full informa
tion having been brought to the tax officials, it is claimed the statute started
to run.
Probably limitations statutes would begin to run in an ordinary creditor’s
suit against stockholders to subject assets received by them from their corpora
tion as soon as there is disclosure of all the facts and denial of liability. But
neither general statutes of limitations nor general doctrines of laches apply to
the government. As to it the general law is that no lapse of time bars the
enforcement of its right. The government’s right, therefore, continued and
has not been lost unless the statute (sec. 250 (d)) expressly bars it.
The statute does expressly bar any suit to recover an income or excess-profits
tax begun more than five years after return was filed under the particular act
which lays the tax. The phraseology of section 250 (d), which treats of “a
return made under an act” and “a tax due under a return made under an act,”
seems cumbersome on first reading, but the purpose is not really ambiguous.
These phrases are adapted from the actual working out and daily administra
tion of the income-tax laws; they are exactly descriptive and applicable to the
actual situation before the revenue department was known to congress. Under
each income-tax law there are regulations promulgated to carry out that law,
and then blank forms of return are prepared to meet the requirements of each
particular law. These blank forms are submitted to the taxpayer to be filled
out and verified by him, and when he has filled out the blank, added the verifi
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cation, and delivered the document to the proper officer, then the taxpayer is
said to have made and filed return under the designated law. And the plain
meaning of congress in section 250 (d) is that such a making and filing of return
under any one of the revenue acts will start the statute in favor of the taxpayer
and against the government. There is nothing in the statute to imply that
anything other than such making of return under the particular act would set
the statute in motion.
Certainly nothing was done by this corporation in the case at bar that pre
sents any equivalent of the action prescribed by congress necessary to start the
statute, namely, the making of a return under the act of October 3, 1917. The
fact that return was made under the act of September 8, 1916, is of no avail to
defendants. Neither is the fact that return was made under the act of March
3, 1917. The making and filing of a return under a particular act being the
starting point of the statute, it is of far-reaching importance that no ambiguity
be injected into a situation that stands clear and certain on the face of the law.
Determination and assessment of the tax has to be made under a particular
law. In the regular and ordinary course such determination and assessment
is upon the basis afforded by the return of the taxpayer under that law. No
time bars such determination and assessment of a tax under a particular law
until the return is made and filed under that particular law.
In the case at bar it is very clear that the officers of the corporation were
advised that there was no liability upon either the corporation or its stock
holders under the act of 1917, and, being so advised, they failed and refused
to make a return such as the statutes and the regulations require, and, having
so failed and refused the statute did not run in favor of the corporation or of
the present defendants.
Cases might arise where there would be controvertible questions whether
certain acts of a taxpayer should be construed to be “ making a return ” so as to
start the running of the limitations—but in this case the deliberate intention is
shown on the part of the corporation and its officers to disavow any obliga
tion under the law either to pay the tax or to comply with the regulations as to
making returns. Their position has been consistent that they were not re
quired either to make returns or to pay any tax. Such being their attitude
they avoided the only thing which could start the statute, viz., the making and
filing of a return. Accordingly the time that has passed since the enactment
of the law of October 3, 1917, has in nowise affected the government’s right to
recover the tax.
The matter of penalties for failure to make return is closely related to the
question here involved. If this corporation had not dissolved but had con
tinued in profitable business its next fiscal year would have ended May 31,
1918. Under the revenue act of 1918 the taxes imposed by the act of October
3, 1917, were entirely superseded by the new taxes for 1918, so that the cor
poration would have had to pay under the 1918 act, and not under the October
3, 1917, act for that period of its fiscal year between January 1, 1918, and
May 31, 1918. Many corporations so circumstanced made their returns
during 1918 in conformity with the act of October 3, 1917, but did not make
the return required under the 1918 act. The question arose as to when pen
alties would accrue against them for failing to make returns for the tax for the
first part of their fiscal year 1918. The matter is discussed in the opinion of
the advisory tax board (T. B. R. 31) C. B. 1-247:

The opinion of the advisory tax board is requested as to whether the addi
tional taxes shall be assessed and specific penalties asserted in the case of corpo
rate taxpayers, which, prior to the passage of the revenue act of 1918, filed tax
returns for fiscal years ending during that year, but are delinquent in filing sup
plemental returns required by the revenue act of 1918.
The general extension of the time to June 15, 1919, for completing corporate
returns is understood to apply to corporations making returns on the basis of
fiscal years ending in 1918, as well as to corporations making returns on the
basis of the calendar year 1918. It is suggested, doubtless because such fiscal
year corporations have already filed returns for the fiscal year 1918, in accord

214

Income-tax Department
ance with the provisions of prior laws that corporations which are delinquent
in filing supplemental returns for such fiscal years ending in 1918 should not
be subject to additional taxes or penalties by reason of such delinquencies.
The filing of supplemental returns by corporations having fiscal years ending
in 1918 is essential to the proper administration of the revenue act of 1918, and
all reasonable measures should be taken to compel such filing. A corporation
which has duly filed its return for such a fiscal year, as required by previous
laws, may be entitled to some consideration on this account and may have some
reason for the belief that it has performed its full duty. On the other hand,
such a corporation is bound to know at its peril of its duty to file such supple
mental return. The extension to June 15, 1919, of the time for filing gives
ample opportunity to a corporation to prepare its supplemental return, espe
cially since many of the items included therein will be identical with items
included in the return previously filed. The filing of a return for a fiscal year
ending in 1918, as required by previous laws, is not therefore in and of itself a
“reasonable cause” within the meaning of the statute (see revised statutes,
section 3176, as amended by section 1317 of the revenue act of 1918) for failure
to file the supplemental return. It seems therefore, that from the standpoint
of the government it is necessary as well as legal, and from the standpoint of
the taxpayer it is not unfair, to assess additional taxes and assert penalties
against corporate taxpayers which are delinquent with respect to such sup
plemental returns.
This ruling has been consistently adhered to by the department as a settled
rule in the orderly administration of the law and in the last internal revenue
Bulletin, Vol. III, August 4, 1924, No. 31, page 10, there appears the following
opinion:
Reference is made to memorandum submitted asking for advice as to the
correct method of computing the 25 per cent penalty on account of failure of the
M. Company to file a return on form 1120 for the fiscal year ended February 28,
1918, within the time prescribed by law.
It appears that the corporation filed timely corporation income tax return,
form 1031, and a corporation excess-profits tax return, form 1103, for the fiscal
year ended February 28, 1918, in accordance with the provisions of the revenue
act of 1916, as amended, and the act of 1917, which returns disclosed a tax
liability of 5X dollars, which was assessed. Subsequently the corporation filed a
delinquent corporation income and profits tax return, form 1120, in accordance
with the revenue act of 1918, for the fiscal year in question, which last-men
tioned return, form 1120, disclosed a total tax liability for the fiscal year of 6x
dollars, upon which total tax liability a penalty of 2x dollars was assessed.
The revenue act of 1918 imposes a tax upon the entire net income received by
a taxpayer during the entire period of any fiscal year ended in the calendar year
1918. Section 205 of said act specifically so states, and makes provisions that
any amount theretofore or thereafter paid on account of the tax imposed for
such fiscal year by title I of the revenue act of 1916 as amended by the revenue
act of 1917 and title I of the revenue act of 1917 shall be credited toward the
payment of the tax imposed for the same period by the revenue act of 1918.
It necessarily follows that the tax previously imposed under the revenue acts
of 1916 and 1917 for any fiscal year beginning in 1917 and ending in 1918, or for
any part of such year, is superseded by the tax imposed under the revenue act
of 1918, and that any return for a fiscal year beginning in 1917 and ending in
1918, filed after the passage of the revenue act of 1918, must be considered as an
original return made under that act.
The penalty for failing to file a timely return under the revenue act of 1918,
as fixed by section 3176, revised statutes, as amended by the revenue act of
1918 is 25 per cent of the tax, which could mean nothing other than the amount
of the tax under the 1918 act.
It is therefore concluded that if a taxpayer filed a timely return under the acts
of 1916 and 1917 for a fiscal year ended in 1918, and later, after the passage of
the revenue act of 1918, filed a delinquent return under the 1918 act for the
same fiscal year, and there was no reasonable cause for the delinquency, there
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should be assessed 25 per cent of the total tax under the revenue act of 1918.
In other words, in the case of the M. Company, the 25 per cent delinquency
penalty attaches to the total tax under the revenue act of 1918. Of course, any
amount heretofore or hereafter paid as a result of the timely returns under the
acts of 1916 and 1917 filed for the fiscal year ended in 1918 prior to the passage
of the revenue act of 1918 must be credited toward the payments of the tax
imposed for such fiscal year by the revenue act of 1918.
In Beam v. Hamilton (289 Fed. 9; T. D. 3519) the court of appeals in the
sixth circuit upheld the imposition of a 50 per cent penalty against a taxpayer
under this same act of October 3, 1917. He had filed an income tax return but
failed to fill out the necessary blanks to show his liability for excess profits taxes
imposed by the act of October 3, 1917. The court on analysis of the act of
October 3, 1917, and prior acts, shows that there were carried into the law of
October 3, 1917, necessary provisions requiring returns to be made and author
izing regulations therefor to be promulgated as well as fixing penalty for failure
to comply. The facts that the taxpayer did make and file certain returns re
quired did not save him from the penalty assessed against him for failure to
make the specific and regular returns under particular and specific provisions
of the law and regulations.
Whether it is a question of penalties against the taxpayer or limitations in his
favor the question is to be determined as to a particular law under which the
return is made or refused. As stated by the advisory tax board in its opinion
the orderly administration of the revenue law requires that the time be certainly
fixed when penalties accrue for failure to make returns, and when the statute
starts running because of good faith returns duly made. Such certainty would
be impossible if acts that were not so intended could be construed into “ making
return,” or if anything short of what the statute clearly intends should be taken
as a substitute either to avoid penalty or to start the statute running. If
liability to pay a particular tax is denied the making and filing of a return
under that particular law which assumes to lay the tax is the only means open
to the protestant to start the statute in his favor.
I find that the act of October 3,1917, supplemented by the proper regulations,
required and obliged the corporation herein to make true and accurate re
turns on the particular form provided, namely, form 1031, and under oath, so
that the commissioner could proceed to determine and assess the tax. Com
pliance was necessary before any question of limitations could arise. No such
return having been made or filed the statute was never set in motion.
Such being the conclusion of the court it will be ordered that the plaintiff
have decree against the defendants as prayed.
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